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Since September 11, Australia’s federal Parliament has enacted a range of exceptional 
measures aimed at preventing terrorism. These measures include control orders, which 
were not designed or intended for use outside of the terrorism context. What has 
followed, however, has been the migration of this measure to new contexts in the states 
and territories, especially in regard to what some have termed the ‘war on bikies’. This 
has occurred to the point that this measure, once considered extreme, has become 
accepted as a normal aspect of the criminal justice system, and has in turn given rise to 
even more stringent legal measures. This article explores the dynamic by which once-
exceptional measures become normalised and then extended to new extremes. It explores 
these issues in the context of the role that constitutional values have played in this process. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
The ‘war on terror’ that arose after the September 11 attacks in the United 
States triggered an expansion of international1 and domestic legal frame-
works2 directed at the prevention of terrorism. Today, that conflict appears to 
be waning, but in many respects the expanded frameworks remain intact. This 
is enabling processes of ‘normalisation’ by which such measures come to be 
treated as unexceptional, rather than as extreme measures that ought to be 
strictly limited in their application. In this form, they are more readily 
adapted to other areas of the legal system. Outside of the anti-terror context, 
the now-normalised measures can give rise to even more extreme laws that 
further challenge fundamental values. In this sense the legal responses to the 
war on terror can continue indefinitely outside of the anti-terror context and 
have a permanent impact on constitutional values. 
We explore this dynamic by focusing on an Australian case study, namely 
the migration of control orders from the anti-terror context to the body of 
legislation that has emerged in what might be called a ‘war on bikies’.3 Control 
orders are civil orders that empower courts to impose a wide range of 
restrictions and obligations on an individual, such as curfews, limits on 
 
 1 For example, the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1373 of 2001 has been 
described as Security Council ‘legislation’ on the basis of its unilateral, mandatory, general 
and novel nature: C H Powell, ‘The United Nations Security Council, Terrorism and the Rule 
of Law’ in Victor V Ramraj et al (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 19, 23, 29–30, citing SC Res 1373, UN SCOR, 56th sess, 
4385th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). See also SC Res 1624, UN SCOR, 60th 
sess, 5261st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005). 
 2 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Security Council’s Anti-Terror Resolutions and Their Implementation by 
Member States: An Overview’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1044, 1051; 
George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University 
Law Review 1136; Bernadette McSherry, ‘Terrorism Offences in the Criminal Code: Broaden-
ing the Boundaries of Australian Criminal Laws’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 354; Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Kent Roach, ‘The Criminal Law and Its Less Restrained Alternatives’ 
in Victor V Ramraj et al (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 91. 
 3 The earlier migration of control orders from the United Kingdom to Australia has been 
explored in, for example, Andrew Lynch, ‘Control Orders in Australia: A Further Case Study 
in the Migration of British Counter-Terrorism Law’ (2008) 8 Oxford University Common-
wealth Law Journal 159; Andrew Lynch, Tamara Tulich and Rebecca Welsh, ‘Secrecy and 
Control Orders: The Role and Vulnerability of Constitutional Values in the United Kingdom 
and Australia’ in David Cole, Federico Fabbrini and Arianna Vedaschi (eds), Secrecy, Nation-
al Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2013) 154; Lisa Burton 
and George Williams, ‘What Future for Australia’s Control Order Regime?’ (2013) 24 Public 
Law Review 182. 
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communication, and the like, for the purpose of preventing future criminal 
acts. A person may be the subject of a control order, and therefore subject to a 
deprivation of liberty, without any finding that they have transgressed the law. 
In this way, control orders operate independently of any concept of guilt 
or innocence. 
We begin in Part II by introducing Australia’s response to the global threat 
of terrorism and the rhetoric of urgency, exceptionalism and war that attend-
ed the enactment of a host of anti-terror laws following the 9/11 attacks, 
including control orders. In Part III, we document the proliferation of control 
order-like schemes across Australia, tracing their migration from the anti-
terror context to the fight against serious and organised crime. This process of 
migration and subsequent normalisation has not gone unnoticed. Writing in 
2010, Gabrielle Appleby and John Williams observed the ‘creep’ of anti-terror 
laws to the law and order context,4 and one of us writing with Nicola McGar-
rity said: ‘counter-terrorism laws have become a permanent fixture of the legal 
landscape. … Over time, what were once seen as extraordinary laws have 
become accepted as “normal”’.5 
Not only has the control order device itself migrated across contexts, but it 
has provided a vehicle for the more subtle migration of certain characteristic 
features of national security laws. Hence, the expanded use of secret evidence, 
crimes of association and preventive constraints on liberty have also gone 
through a similar process of normalisation.6 
In Part IV, we explore more recent developments that signal the next phase 
of the migration and normalisation process. In the ongoing political race to be 
‘tough on crime’, the adaption of once-extreme measures has given rise to the 
extension of these measures into new, even more extreme territory. In Part V, 
we reflect on this process of migration, normalisation and extension and 
examine the role played by constitutional values in both checking and 
facilitating such trends. 
 
 4 Gabrielle Appleby and John Williams, ‘The Anti-Terror Creep: Law and Order, the States and 
the High Court of Australia’ in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), 
Counter-Terrorism and Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 
2010) 150. 
 5 Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, ‘When Extraordinary Measures Become Normal: 
Pre-emption in Counter-Terrorism and Other Laws’ in Nicola McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and 
George Williams (eds), Counter-Terrorism and Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice after 
9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 131, 132. 
 6 Ibid; Lynch, Tulich and Welsh, above n 3. 
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II   A U S T R A L IA’S  WA R  O N  TE R R O R  A N D  CO N T R O L  OR D E R S 
A  Enacting Anti-Terror Laws 
Prior to 9/11 Australia had no national laws dealing specifically with terror-
ism. Since then, the Australian government has enacted more than 60 such 
laws,7 an approach Kent Roach aptly described as one of ‘hyper-legislation’.8 
Australia’s national anti-terror laws are striking not just in their volume, but 
also in their scope.9 They include provisions for warrantless searches,10 the 
banning of organisations,11 preventive detention,12 and the secret detention 
and interrogation of non-suspect citizens by the Australian Security Intelli-
gence Organisation (‘ASIO’).13 The passage of these laws was eased by Austral-
ia’s lack of a national bill or charter of rights. It was also assisted by a rhetoric 
of urgency and exceptionalism that enabled the laws’ speedy enactment. 
In March 2002, federal Attorney-General Daryl Williams introduced the 
first package of anti-terrorism legislation to parliament. In doing so, 
Mr Williams conceded that the measures being introduced were ‘extraordi-
nary’14 but, he noted, ‘so too is the evil at which they are directed’.15 The 
federal government justified these measures by emphasising both the grave 
harm threatened by terrorism and the goal of terrorists to disrupt or even 
destroy government institutions. These two factors were harnessed to demon-
strate why the existing criminal law provided an insufficient legal response to 
the problem of terrorism. Simply put, the state could not afford to wait until a 
terrorist act had been committed, but must prevent it from occurring in the 
first place. To this end, anti-terror laws aimed at the prevention of future acts 
of terror were introduced.16 
 
 7 George Williams, ‘The Legal Legacy of the “War on Terror”’ (2013) 12 Macquarie Law 
Journal 3, 6–7; Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’, above n 2, 1140–5. 
 8 Roach, The 9/11 Effect, above n 2, 309. 
 9 Williams, ‘The Legal Legacy of the “War on Terror”’, above n 7, 7–10; Williams, ‘A Decade of 
Australian Anti-Terror Laws’, above n 2, 1146–53. 
 10 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3UEA. 
 11 Provided that the Attorney-General is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation 
‘is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of 
a terrorist act’ or ‘advocates the doing of a terrorist act’ (discussed further below): Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch (‘Criminal Code (Cth)’) ss 102.1(2)(a)–(b). 
 12 Criminal Code (Cth) div 105. 
 13 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) pt III div 3. 
 14 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1936. 
 15 Ibid. 
 16 See generally McGarrity and Williams, above n 5, 131. 
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The passage of the federal anti-terror control order provisions reflected 
this same approach. Control orders were introduced as part of a much larger 
package of legislation, the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth), in the wake 
of the terrorist bombings in London in July 2005. This sizable statute also 
created preventative detention orders (‘PDOs’)17 and updated sedition 
offences.18 Attention was drawn to the London attacks, as well as to earlier 
bombings in Spain, Bali and the United States, throughout the course of its 
enactment.19 These acts of terror, it was argued, highlighted the grave threat 
that faced Australians both at home and overseas and the pressing need to 
prevent future crimes of this nature. As Senator Stephen Conroy argued: 
the substance of legislation of this kind is a response to a new threat, not a re-
sponse to community fear. Let me be clear: the threat of a terrorist attack in this 
country is real. This is not hyperbole or scaremongering. The events of New 
York, Madrid, London, Bali and Singapore ought to make it patently clear that 
no country is immune from the current danger. 
As I said earlier, suicide bombers pose a new and unique threat to the secu-
rity of individual Australians. Terrorism poses a grave threat to the basic right 
to security of every individual in Australia. That is the context of the current 
debate.20 
The Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth) was introduced into Parliament on 
3 November 2005. It was accompanied by a statement by Attorney-General 
Philip Ruddock that ‘the government would like all elements of the anti-
terrorism legislation package to become law before Christmas’.21 This abbrevi-
 
 17 Criminal Code (Cth) div 105, as inserted by Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) sch 4 
item 24. 
 18 Criminal Code (Cth) div 80, as amended by Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) sch 7 
items 5–12. 
 19 See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 19 (George 
Brandis), 120 (Mark Bishop); see especially at 30, where Robert Hill said: 
Perhaps the government is focusing on the 88 innocent Australians who were killed while 
enjoying a holiday in Bali. … [I]nnocent Australians — men, women and children — 
who were slaughtered by those who sought to use them as political pawns in an interna-
tional terrorist operation. The Australian government believes that we should do all with-
in reason to protect Australians from this sort of threat. If it means that there will be a 
loss of some civil liberties, so be it. 
  See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 November 
2005, 56 (Stuart Henry), 89 (Philip Ruddock). 
 20 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 129. At this time Conroy 
was Deputy Opposition Leader in the Senate. 
 21 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 November 2005, 102. 
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ated process left little time for parliamentary scrutiny or deliberation, let alone 
close consideration by parliamentary committees. The Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee conducted an inquiry into the Bill, 
however this inquiry allowed only a 6-day period of calling for submissions, 
3 days of hearings, and 10 days to prepare the final report.22 The Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) was passed on 7 December 2005.23 In 
retrospect this urgency appears unjustified. The sedition provisions have 
never been used. PDOs were first used in September 2014, and the first 
control order was not issued until late 2006.24 
At the time of enactment, concerns raised in relation to the derogation of 
anti-terror laws from basic constitutional and criminal justice principles were 
typically met by legislators on two fronts: 
First, using rhetoric such as the ‘war on terror’, they claimed that the threat 
posed by terrorism was both extraordinary and temporary.25 As soon as the 
threat was eliminated — a question of ‘when’ and not ‘if ’ — anti-terror laws 
would cease to be necessary and could be repealed.26 Second, legislators distin-
guished between terrorism and ‘ordinary’ criminal activity.27 
This is demonstrated in Mr Ruddock’s statement introducing the Anti-
Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth) to Parliament: 
 
 22 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of 
the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) 1. The Committee advertised for submissions on 
5 November 2005 in The Australian newspaper. The deadline for submissions was set at 
11 November 2005, to assist the committee to meet its reporting deadline of 28 November 
2005. Three days of hearings were held in Sydney on Monday 14, Thursday 17 and Friday 18 
November 2005. 
 23 For discussion of the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth), see Williams, 
‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’, above n 2, 1165. 
 24 Andrew Lynch, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, Inside Australia’s Anti-Terrorism 
Laws and Trials (NewSouth Publishing, 2015) 133, 181. For discussion of the necessity and 
use of control orders and PDOs, see Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, 
Declassified Annual Report (2012) 13–25, 38, 45. 
 25 For a discussion of this in the United States context, see Lee Jarvis, ‘Times of Terror: Writing 
Temporality into the War on Terror’ (2008) 1 Critical Studies on Terrorism 245. 
 26 This is evidenced in Australia by the inclusion, in some pieces of counter-terrorism 
legislation, including the control order regime, of sunset clauses or a requirement that a 
review be held after a specified period of time has elapsed, or both. However, such mecha-
nisms may prove to be of limited effectiveness: Nicola McGarrity, Rishi Gulati and George 
Williams, ‘Sunset Clauses in Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review 
307. 
 27 McGarrity and Williams, above n 5, 131. 
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[We all understand the proposition] that it is better that 10 guilty men go free 
than one innocent person be convicted. If you are going to extrapolate that to 
say that it is better that large numbers of civilians be killed by terrorist acts be-
cause we are unwilling to put in place measures that might reasonably con-
strain … yes, control orders are new; they are very different. The burden of 
proof is different. It is certainly not within the criminal code as we would nor-
mally understand it, with the normal burdens of proof that follow, because 
what we are seeking to do is to protect people’s lives from possible terrorist 
acts. … Yes, we are dealing with something that is very different and that is not 
understood in the context of criminal law as we know it. But in our view the 
circumstances warrant it. That is the justification.28 
Emphasising the unique nature of the terrorist threat served to justify the 
introduction of special anti-terror laws, with existing criminal laws being cast 
as inadequate to deal with the threat posed by terrorism. This form of 
justification also served to reassure people that the new laws would only be 
used in the anti-terror context. 
B  Control Orders 
The control order provisions introduced into the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth) sch (‘Criminal Code (Cth)’) div 104 can be used to impose far-reaching 
restrictions or obligations on an individual for the purpose of preventing 
terrorism. The terms of a control order may relate to the person’s presence at 
certain places, contact with certain people, use of telecommunications or 
technology, possession of things or substances, activities, wearing of a 
tracking device, reporting to certain people at particular times and places, 
fingerprinting and photographing for the purpose of ensuring compliance 
with the order, and participation in consensual counselling or education.29 
 
 28 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 November 2005,  
100–1; see also at 56–7 (Stuart Henry); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 
5 December 2005, 19 (George Brandis), 120 (Mark Bishop), 129 (Stephen Conroy). Also, for 
example, in introducing the Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Warrants) Bill 2005 (NSW) 
into the New South Wales Parliament, the Attorney-General of that State, Bob Debus, said: 
The threat posed by terrorism clearly poses unique challenges. … General criminal activi-
ty has never aimed to perpetrate the mass taking of life, the widespread destruction of 
property, or the wholesale disruption of society in the way that terrorism does. The pow-
ers in the bill are not designed or intended to be used for general policing. 
  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9 June 2005, 16 940. 
 29 Criminal Code (Cth) ss 104.5(3), 104.5(6). 
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Although the restrictions and obligations available under a control order fall 
short of imprisonment in a state facility, the orders may inhibit a person’s 
liberty even to the point of imposing house arrest.30  
Civil preventive orders were not unknown in Australia prior to the enact-
ment of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). The key instances of such 
orders involved the continued incarceration and supervised release of persons 
convicted of serious sex offences at the completion of their sentences.31 Such 
orders could only be imposed on persons serving a term of imprisonment for 
a serious offence, and were contingent upon an assessment that the individual 
posed a continuing danger to the community. Control orders, on the other 
hand, exist entirely outside the criminal justice system. Control orders may be 
imposed on persons neither convicted of, nor even charged with, a criminal 
offence, and the orders are not directly concerned with the likelihood that the 
individual will commit serious offences in the future. 
Control orders under div 104 of the Criminal Code (Cth) may be issued in 
respect of adults not suspected of involvement in criminal wrongdoing. A 
child aged 16 or 17 years may also be subject to an order if he or she is 
suspected of involvement in a terrorism-related crime.32 The maximum 
duration of a control order is 12 months from the date the interim order is 
served on the person.33 There are no limits on seeking consecutive control 
orders over an individual.34 
Division 104 enables the Australian Federal Police (‘AFP’) to seek two 
kinds of orders from a federal court. With the consent of the Attorney-
General, the AFP may first seek an interim control order from an issuing 
 
 30 For criticism, see, eg, Paul Fairall and Wendy Lacey, ‘Preventative Detention and Control 
Orders under Federal Law: The Case for a Bill of Rights’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law 
Review 1072; Burton and Williams, above n 3. 
 31 See, eg, Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW), which was found invalid in Kable v 
DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), 
which was found valid in Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; Serious Sex Offenders 
Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic), as repealed by Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) 
Act 2009 (Vic) s 200. For discussion of these orders as contrasted to Australia’s preventive 
anti-terror schemes, see Tamara Tulich, ‘Prevention and Pre-emption in Australia’s Domestic 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation’ (2012) 1 International Journal for Crime and Justice 52. 
 32 See Criminal Code (Cth) s 104.28. 
 33 Ibid s 104.16(1)(d). 
 34 Ibid s 104.5(2). In his 2012 report the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor 
(‘INSLM’) reasoned that the proceedings with respect to Joseph Thomas demonstrated that 
‘once a person has trained with a terrorist organisation that person will always meet the 
requirements for a [control order]’: INSLM, above n 24, 24. This observation highlights the 
likelihood and ease with which consecutive control orders may be obtained. 
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court.35 Interim orders are issued ex parte and without notice to the affected 
person. They may be issued where a court is satisfied, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the order would ‘substantially assist in preventing a terrorist 
attack’,36 or ‘that the person has provided training to … [or] received training 
from a listed terrorist organisation’.37 In 2014, amendments to the control 
order provisions introduced further grounds on which an order may be 
issued, including where a person has engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign 
country, or has been convicted of a terrorism offence in Australia or a 
foreign country.38 
Additionally, each term of the control order must be ‘reasonably necessary, 
and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the 
public from a terrorist attack’.39 A distinctive quality of control orders is that 
the subject of an order need not have been found guilty of any criminal 
wrongdoing unless the control order is issued under the final ground which 
captures those convicted of terrorism offences. In this sense, control orders 
may provide an alternative, rather than an adjunct, to the criminal jus-
tice system. 
If an interim control order is issued, the AFP must then elect whether to 
seek a confirmed control order. Confirmation proceedings take the form of an 
open and contested hearing before an issuing court, and will occur as soon as 
practicable (but at least 72 hours after the interim order is made, and at least 
48 hours after the interim order is served on the person).40 The same grounds 
for issuing control orders apply at both the interim and confirmation stages.41 
The term ‘listed terrorist organisation’ is central to the grounds on which 
control orders may be issued. This phrase refers to organisations declared to 
be terrorist organisations by the Attorney-General, once he or she is satisfied 
on reasonable grounds that the relevant organisation is directly or indirectly 
 
 35 Issuing courts are the Federal Court of Australia, the Family Court of Australia and the 
Federal Circuit Court of Australia: Criminal Code (Cth) s 100.1 (definition of ‘issuing court’). 
The court receives the application in the same form it was presented to the Attorney-General, 
subject to any changes required by the Attorney-General, as well as information sworn by the 
applicant and the written consent of the Attorney-General: at s 104.3. 
 36 Ibid s 104.4(1)(c)(i). 
 37 Ibid s 104.4(1)(c)(ii). 
 38 Ibid ss 104.4(1)(c)(iii)–(v). The additional grounds were introduced by the Counter-
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth) and the Counter-
Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth). 
 39 Criminal Code (Cth) s 104.4(1)(d). 
 40 Ibid ss 104.5(1A), 104.12(1)(a). 
 41 See ibid ss 104.4(1)(c)–(d), 104.16(1)(a). 
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engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in, fostering or advocating the 
performance of a terrorist act (whether or not the terrorist act has occurred or 
will occur).42 Amendments to the Criminal Code (Cth) in 2002 created serious 
offences in connection with listed terrorist organisations, including support, 
membership and training offences.43 It is also an offence to associate on two or 
more occasions with members, or with persons who promote or direct a listed 
terrorist organisation.44 Penalties for these offences are severe, extending in 
some cases to imprisonment for up to 25 years.45 The Attorney-General’s 
decision to list a terrorist organisation is subject to review by the courts (on 
the basis of the legality but not the merits of the decision), by Parliament and 
its committees (on a discretionary basis) and by the Attorney-General.46 A 
terrorist organisation may also be declared by a court, applying the same 
criteria as listed above, in the course of a criminal trial involving terrorism 
offences.47 As will be seen below, this technique of pairing the executive 
designation of criminal organisations with novel offences and serious penal-
ties has had a considerable influence on recent developments in criminal law 
reform in the states. 
At each stage of the control order process, information may be withheld on 
the basis of national security concerns. For example, in obtaining written 
consent to request an interim control order, the AFP must provide the 
Attorney-General with certain background and supporting information 
including a summary of the grounds for making the interim order.48 However, 
the legislation provides that information may be withheld from the summary 
of grounds if its disclosure would be ‘likely to prejudice national security’ 
within the meaning of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil 
 
 42 See ibid ss 100.1 (definition of ‘listed terrorist organisation’), 102.1 (definition of ‘terrorist 
organisation’). There are 10 organisations now officially listed, all of them Islamic-based and 
many of them Al Qa’ida-related: Criminal Code Regulations 2002 (Cth) pt 2. 
 43 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) sch 1 item 4, inserting Criminal 
Code (Cth) ss 102.3–102.7. 
 44 Criminal Code (Cth) s 102.8. 
 45 See ibid div 102 sub-div B. On the difficulties in prosecuting terrorist organisation offences 
experienced in Australia’s terrorism trials to 2010, see Nicola McGarrity, ‘“Testing” Our 
Counter-Terrorism Laws: The Prosecution of Individuals for Terrorism Offences in Australia’ 
(2010) 34 Criminal Law Journal 92, 100, 126. 
 46 Andrew Lynch, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, ‘The Proscription of Terrorist 
Organisations in Australia’ (2009) 37 Federal Law Review 1, 10–12. 
 47 Ibid 7. 
 48 Criminal Code (Cth) s 104.2(3)(f). The AFP’s request must also address: the proposed order, 
facts supporting the making of the order, and a history of control order and PDO proceed-
ings in which the individual has been involved: see generally at s 104.2(3). 
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Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (‘NSIA’).49 Under the NSIA, ‘likely to prejudice 
national security’ is defined as ‘a real, and not merely a remote, possibility that 
the disclosure will prejudice national security’,50 and ‘national security’ is 
broadly defined as ‘Australia’s defence, security, international relations or law 
enforcement interests’.51 Information that is served on the person or relied 
upon in court may be withheld on the same grounds.52 Additionally, infor-
mation may also be withheld from the person if it is assessed as likely to be 
protected by public interest immunity, or if its disclosure would be likely to 
put at risk ongoing operations by law enforcement agencies or intelligence 
agencies, or the safety of the community, law enforcement officers or intelli-
gence officers.53 
Two individuals have been subject to control orders in Australia under 
div 104 of the Criminal Code (Cth): Joseph Thomas and David Hicks.54 The 
former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (‘INSLM’), Bret 
Walker SC, reported that the AFP had, by the end of 2012, considered the 
commencement of control order proceedings against 23 other individuals. In 
almost half of these instances, the control order was considered as a response 
to there being insufficient evidence on which to prosecute the person for 
terrorism offences.55 Despite the AFP electing not to seek a control order in 
these instances, the INSLM strongly criticised the possibility that a control 
order might be sought in such circumstances as being offensive to the rule 
of law.56 
Joseph Thomas, known as ‘Jihad Jack’ in contemporary media, was an 
Australian citizen who travelled to Pakistan in 2001 where he undertook three 
months of paramilitary training with Al Qa’ida at the Al Farooq training 
camp.57 Thomas was captured, imprisoned and interrogated in Pakistan before 
being returned to Australia. Upon his return in 2006, Thomas was charged 
with two counts of providing support to a terrorist organisation, each of 
 
 49 Ibid s 104.2(3A). 
 50 NSIA s 17. 
 51 Ibid s 8. 
 52 Criminal Code (Cth) s 104.12A(3)(a). 
 53 Ibid ss 104.12A(3)(b)–(d). 
 54 For discussion, see Burton and Williams, above n 3, 191–3. 
 55 INSLM, above n 24, 13. 
 56 Ibid 31. 
 57 See Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 310. 
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which led to an acquittal in the Supreme Court of Victoria.58 In a step that 
Andrew Lynch suggested may be criticised as an instance of ‘jurisprudential 
context-shopping’,59 less than two weeks after the acquittals, the AFP relied on 
the same evidence in order to obtain an interim control order against Thomas 
in the Federal Magistrates Court.60 
A control order was issued in respect of Hicks upon the completion of his 
sentence for providing material support for terrorism handed down by United 
States Military Commission in 2007. Hicks pleaded guilty to this charge, 
which has since been held not to have been a valid offence under international 
law at the relevant time.61 Prior to Hicks’ Military Commission hearing he was 
held by United States forces at Guantánamo Bay for five years with-
out charge.62 
The control orders issued in respect of Thomas and Hicks required, in 
general terms, that the individual stay at his residence between midnight and 
5:00 am or 6:00 am respectively, report to the police three times a week, not 
contact members of terrorist organisations, not use unapproved email, mobile 
phone or internet technology, not leave the country without permission, and 
not possess weapons or military training materials.63 During Thomas’ interim 
control order proceedings, Mowbray FM reportedly said that some of the 
requested restrictions were ‘silly’, such as the inclusion of Osama bin Laden’s 
name on the list of individuals Thomas would be prohibited from contact-
 
 58 DPP (Cth) v Thomas [2006] VSC 120 (31 March 2006), cited in Andrew Lynch, ‘Thomas v 
Mowbray: Australia’s “War on Terror” Reaches the High Court’ (2008) 32 Melbourne Univer-
sity Law Review 1182, 1187. Thomas was convicted on two lesser charges of intentionally 
receiving funds from a terrorist organisation and possessing a falsified passport: see Criminal 
Code (Cth) s 102.6(1); Passports Act 1938 (Cth) s 9A. Each of these convictions was quashed 
on appeal: R v Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475. 
 59 Lynch, ‘Thomas v Mowbray’, above n 58, 1188, quoting Lucia Zedner, ‘Seeking Security by 
Eroding Rights: The Side-Stepping of Due Process’ in Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus 
(eds), Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 257, 265. See also Helen Fenwick, 
Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Routledge-Cavendish, 4th ed, 2007) 1340–2; INSLM, 
above n 24, 17. 
 60 Jabbour v Thomas (2006) 165 A Crim R 32. The Federal Magistrates Court has since been 
renamed the Federal Circuit Court. 
 61 Hamdan v United States, 696 F 3d 1238, 1251 (DC Cir, 2012) (Judge Kavanaugh). 
 62 Hicks had been detained as a consequence of his involvement with Al Qa’ida forces in 
Afghanistan. The control order over Hicks expired in 2008. For critique, see Timo-
thy L H McCormack, ‘David Hicks and the Charade of Guantánamo Bay’ (2007) 8 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 273. 
 63 Jabbour v Thomas (2006) 165 A Crim R 32, 43–6; Jabbour v Hicks (2007) 183 A Crim R 297, 
309–11. 
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ing.64 This original list of names totalled over 300 pages and was reduced to 
some 50 names in the eventual order.65 
Only Hicks’ control order was confirmed. The interim control order im-
posed upon Thomas did not reach confirmation stage because, before this 
could occur, Thomas commenced proceedings in the High Court challenging 
the constitutional validity of the scheme. This challenge had two parts. First, 
Thomas alleged that the provisions were beyond the constitutionally enumer-
ated lawmaking powers of the federal government. Secondly, he argued that 
the provisions violated the strict separation of judicial power implied from 
ch III of the Constitution. The High Court had interpreted ch III to preclude 
non-judicial powers from being vested in federal courts (unless they were 
incidental or ancillary to a judicial function).66 In the absence of a national bill 
or charter of rights, ch III has played an increasingly important role as a limit 
on government power, as well as a source of rights protection for citizens and 
states.67 Thomas claimed that the power to issue control orders was not 
judicial in nature and therefore the provisions were invalid insofar as they 
vested that power in federal courts. 
In 2007 in Thomas v Mowbray, Thomas’ High Court challenge failed on 
both grounds68 — subject to the strong dissenting opinions of Kirby J and 
Hayne J.69 For a majority of the Court, div 104 was an appropriate use of the 
federal government’s power to make laws with respect to the defence of the 
nation.70 Their Honours also held that, while the power to issue control orders 
 
 64 ‘Thomas Control Order “Silly”’, The Age (online), 31 August 2006 <http://www.theage.com. 
au/news/national/thomas-control-order-silly/2006/08/31/1156817006116.html>. 
 65 See Jabbour v Thomas (2006) 165 A Crim R 32, 39 [56] (Mowbray FM), 45. 
 66 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271–2 (Dixon CJ, 
McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
 67 See George Williams and David Hume, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 325–8; James Stellios, ‘Reconceiving the Separation of 
Judicial Power’ (2010) 22 Public Law Review 113, 119–20; George Winterton, ‘The Separation 
of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights’ in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), Future Directions in 
Australian Constitutional Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Leslie Zines (Federation Press, 
1994) 185. 
 68 (2007) 233 CLR 307. 
 69 Though Hayne J agreed with the majority justices that the provisions were supported by s 51 
of the Constitution: ibid 459–60 [444]. 
 70 See Constitution s 51(vi); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 324–6 [7]–[9] 
(Gleeson CJ), 359–64 [132]–[148] (Gummow and Crennan JJ), 449–60 [411]–[445] 
(Hayne J), 504–6 [585]–[590] (Callinan J); Lynch, ‘Thomas v Mowbray’, above n 58, 1189–96; 
Hernan Pintos-Lopez and George Williams, ‘“Enemies Foreign and Domestic”: Thomas v 
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differed from the traditional conception of judicial powers, it was nonetheless 
in keeping with the fundamental constitutional value of judicial independ-
ence, and was sufficiently analogous to other powers exercisable by courts so 
as to justify its classification as a valid judicial power.71 
The decision in Thomas v Mowbray dealt with complex areas of Australian 
constitutional law. Our focus rests not with the decision itself, but with its 
aftermath. In particular, the decision has been used to provide legal authority 
for the notion that these kinds of preventive orders are in keeping with 
constitutional values. In this way, the case paved the way for the migration of 
control orders, as well as the related schemes of secret evidence and declared 
criminal organisations, beyond the anti-terror context.72 
III   CO N T R O L  OR D E R S  MU LT I P L I E D:  T H E  WA R  O N  B I K I E S  
Writing in 2002, Lucia Zedner and Janne Flyghed noted the potential for the 
migration of national security measures to the law and order context. For 
Zedner, the most serious threats to security provide ‘the underlying rationale 
and licence for measures that tackle much lesser risks but pose no small threat 
to basic liberties’.73 Flyghed similarly observed that once new coercive 
measures have been introduced to counteract extremely serious forms of 
crime, such as terrorism, ‘there follows a slide towards their employment in 
connection with increasingly minor offences’.74 Following the High Court’s 
decision in Thomas v Mowbray, this slide began to play out across Australia. 
When Thomas v Mowbray was handed down, political leaders in the Aus-
tralian states had for some time been adopting hard-line, tough on crime 
policies. As Appleby and Williams observed: 
Being tough on law and order is important politically. Law and order consist-
ently rates highly in surveys of community concerns, and receives a large 
 
Mowbray and the New Scope of the Defence Power’ (2008) 27 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 83. 
 71 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 327–8 [15] (Gleeson CJ), 347–8 [78]–[79] 
(Gummow and Crennan JJ), 506–7 [591]–[596] (Callinan J). For discussion and critique of 
the case, see Denise Meyerson, ‘Using Judges to Manage Risk: The Case of Thomas v Mow-
bray’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 209; Lynch, ‘Thomas v Mowbray’, above n 58; Christos 
Mantziaris, ‘Commonwealth Judicial Power for Interim Control Orders — The Chapter III 
Questions Not Answered’ (2009) 10 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 65. 
 72 See Lynch, ‘Control Orders in Australia’, above n 3; Lynch, Tulich and Welsh, above n 3. 
 73 Zedner, above n 59, 264. 
 74 Janne Flyghed, ‘Normalising the Exceptional: The Case of Political Violence’ (2002) 13 
Policing and Society 23, 28. 
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amount of media coverage which tends to call for greater police presence, new 
offences and harsher sentences … The States undoubtedly perceive there to be a 
political need to respond to these calls.75 
As a result, the decision in Thomas v Mowbray, and its validation of control 
orders as providing a permissible means of imposing harsh restrictions on 
‘would-be criminals’, fell on fertile ground. 
Within a year of Thomas v Mowbray giving the constitutional ‘thumbs up’ 
to control orders, the South Australian Parliament enacted the Serious and 
Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) (‘SOCCA’). This statute was touted 
as an ‘anti-bikie law’ and marketed as part of the State’s efforts to combat 
outlaw motorcycle gangs.76 Whilst South Australian law already provided for 
criminal profits confiscation, fortification removal notices and regulations 
aimed at preventing bikies from working in certain industries, control orders 
marked a significant new step in Premier Mike Rann’s ‘highly successful 
policy platform’ of taking a hard-line approach to law and order.77  
In introducing the SOCCA, Rann not only adopted the legal model of anti-
terror control orders but reproduced the same rhetoric of urgency, war and 
extreme threat to support the enactment of the measures. Legislation specifi-
cally modelled on the federal anti-terror laws was necessary according to 
Rann ‘because [organised crime groups] are terrorists within our communi-
ty’.78 Denouncing bikie gangs as ‘an evil within our nation’, Rann claimed that 
the South Australian control order legislation would not only ‘lead Australia 
in the fight against bikie gangs’, but be the toughest in the world.79  
The SOCCA draws directly upon the Commonwealth’s national security 
laws — control orders for individuals are only made once their membership 
of, or association with, a ‘declared organisation’ is established. Both the 
process by which an organisation is declared and the basis on which the 
declaration can be issued resemble the federal provisions for listing terrorist 
organisations.80 Under the SOCCA control order scheme as it was originally 
 
 75 Appleby and Williams, ‘The Anti-Terror Creep’, above n 4, 151. 
 76 See Gabrielle J Appleby and John M Williams, ‘A New Coat of Paint: Law and Order and the 
Refurbishment of Kable’ (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 1, 1–4. 
 77 Ibid 3. 
 78 ABC Radio National, ‘South Australia’s Plans to Obliterate Outlaw Bikie Gangs’, The Law 
Report, 6 May 2008 (Mike Rann). 
 79 ‘SA Government to Ban Bikie Gangs’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 20 November 
2007 <http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/SA-government-to-ban-bikie-gangs/2007/11/ 
20/1195321747018.html>. 
 80 See generally SOCCA pt 2; Criminal Code (Cth) div 102. 
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introduced in 2008, organisations were declared by the South Australian 
Attorney-General, just as terrorist organisations are declared by the federal 
Attorney-General (in amendments discussed below, this process has since 
been moved to the judicial sphere).81 
The basis for declaring a criminal organisation under the SOCCA is a find-
ing that ‘members of the organisation associate for the purpose of organising, 
planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity’ and 
‘the organisation represents a risk to public safety and order in [South 
Australia]’.82 Similarly, a terrorist organisation may be declared on the basis 
that it is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in, 
fostering or advocating the performance of a terrorist act.83 
Both the SOCCA and the federal anti-terror control order schemes capture 
organisations that commit criminal acts, as well as those that engage in 
preparatory or supportive conduct towards the commission of those acts. The 
language of the two declaration schemes is not identical, but there is signifi-
cant overlap in, for example, the references to ‘advocating’ and ‘supporting’, 
‘fostering’ and ‘facilitating’, and ‘preparing’ and ‘organising’. The SOCCA’s 
declaration scheme qualifies the basis on which an organisation may be 
declared by providing that the organisation must also pose a risk to public 
safety. However, this additional requirement would not be difficult to establish 
once the connection between the organisation and the commission of serious 
criminal acts is made out. The clearest distinction between declared criminal 
organisations and listed terrorist organisations is that the latter is concerned 
only with the commission of terrorist acts, whereas the former is concerned 
with the commission of serious crimes more broadly. In all, the declaration 
scheme in the SOCCA bears a strong resemblance to both the process and 
grounds by which terrorist organisations are declared under the Criminal 
Code (Cth). 
While the declaration processes are much the same under the SOCCA and 
the federal anti-terror laws, the consequences are not. South Australia did not 
incorporate terrorist organisation-style offences — such as membership or 
 
 81 SOCCA s 10; Criminal Code (Cth) ss 100.1 (definition of ‘listed terrorist organisation’), 
102.1(1) (definition of ‘terrorist organisation’), 102.1(2). Declarations by the South Australian 
Attorney-General are made following an application by the Commissioner of Police. Under 
the federal scheme, the Attorney-General may act on his or her own initiative but, in prac-
tice, relies on advice from ASIO: Lynch, McGarrity and Williams, ‘The Proscription of Ter-
rorist Organisations in Australia’, above n 46, 6. 
 82 SOCCA s 11(1). 
 83 Criminal Code (Cth) s 102.1(2). 
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promotion — but limited the relevance of the declarations to civil control 
order proceedings. It will be seen in Part IV that reforms in Queensland have 
now taken this extra step of importing organisation-based criminal offences. 
The effect of bikie control orders under the SOCCA is to restrict members 
of declared organisations from associating with other members of the 
organisation or carrying on certain activities.84 Like anti-terror control orders, 
a wide range of potential obligations and restrictions on a person’s behaviour 
and associations may be imposed by a court, first in ex parte proceedings and 
then, if the person lodges an objection to the order, in a contested hearing.85 
The terms of a bikie control order may be broadly phrased, prohibiting a 
person from associating with a class of persons, or being in the vicinity of 
certain kinds of places, or carrying objects of a certain kind.86 Breach of the 
terms of a control order has the potential to result in criminal prosecution 
and imprisonment.87 
Secret evidence plays an integral part in both declaration and control order 
processes under the SOCCA. The Attorney-General was not required to 
provide reasons for his or her decision to declare an organisation.88 Infor-
mation provided to the Attorney-General that was classified by the Commis-
sioner of Police as ‘criminal intelligence’ was not to be disclosed except to 
specifically authorised persons.89 Criminal intelligence was defined as 
information relating to actual or suspected criminal activity (whether in [South 
Australia] or elsewhere) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected 
to prejudice criminal investigations, to enable the discovery of the existence or 
identity of a confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement or 
to endanger a person’s life or physical safety.90 
 
 84 SOCCA ss 22(5), 22I(1). See also Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW) 
ss 26–7. 
 85 SOCCA ss 22, 26–7. 
 86 Ibid s 22(5). 
 87 Ibid s 22I. See also Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW) s 26. 
 88 SOCCA s 13(1) (as originally enacted). 
 89 Ibid s 13(2). The exceptions were for a person conducting a review of the legislation or a 
person specifically authorised by the Commissioner. 
 90 Ibid s 3 (definition of ‘criminal intelligence’). This definition is retained in the current version 
of SOCCA. 
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Criminal intelligence has a different focus to ‘national security information’ in 
the NSIA.91 However, it bears close resemblance to other grounds on which 
information may be withheld from a person under div 104 of the Criminal 
Code (Cth), in particular where the information would be likely to put at risk 
ongoing law enforcement or intelligence operations, or risk the safety of the 
community, law enforcement officers or intelligence officers.92 
Once the Commissioner has classified information as criminal intelli-
gence, a court is empowered to assess whether the information was ‘properly’ 
so classified. High Court litigation in 2008 concerning Western Australian 
fortification removal notices issued in respect of bikie gang premises had 
determined that this form of discretionary judicial review is necessary to 
ensure the constitutional validity of secret evidence provisions.93 If properly 
classified, the court is obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the infor-
mation,94 including by removing criminal intelligence information from the 
statement of the grounds on which the control order was issued.95 
Criminal intelligence provisions generally involve a claim for secrecy being 
heard in closed proceedings from which the person and his or her representa-
tives are excluded. If the application is successful, then the information may 
form a basis for the judge’s determination but will still be withheld from the 
person and his or her representatives. Provisions of this kind strike the 
balance between the competing interests of secrecy and procedural fairness 
more heavily in favour of secrecy as, in effect, a party is no longer able to 
know or meet significant aspects of the case against him or her. 
Increased reliance on secret evidence has been identified as an inevitable 
consequence of the intelligence-led approach adopted by many governments 
to meeting the threat of transnational terrorism following 9/11.96 As state 
 
 91 The definition was in fact adopted from South Australian laws also aimed at limiting the 
criminal conduct of bikie gangs and upheld as constitutionally valid in early 2009: see 
K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501. 
 92 Criminal Code (Cth) ss 104.12A(3)(c)–(d). 
 93 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 560 [39] 
(Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ). See also K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing 
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 95 Ibid s 15(4). 
 96 See Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Special Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2010) 
73 Modern Law Review 836, 837 (discussing United Kingdom); Kent Roach, ‘The Eroding 
Distinction between Intelligence and Evidence in Terrorism Investigations’ in Nicola McGar-
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control orders aimed at serious organised crime were adapted from the federal 
national security context, it is little surprise that secret evidence plays a key 
role in both declaration and control order processes. That said, removed from 
the national security context, it is less apparent why such a high and pervasive 
degree of secrecy is required, as opposed to existing principles and doctrines 
such as public interest immunity.97 
The SOCCA was the first of many state organised crime control order 
schemes. Similar schemes have now been introduced in every state and 
territory but for Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory.98 Following 
the SOCCA’s enactment in 2008, the next year saw the introduction of the 
Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW), the Serious Crime 
Control Act 2009 (NT) and the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), and in 
2012 the Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (WA) and the Criminal 
Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic) were enacted. The governments of 
Western Australia and Victoria delayed the commencement of their control 
order statutes so as to await High Court decisions on the validity of existing 
control order schemes, in the hope of designing ‘challenge-proof ’ provisions.99 
Each control order statute was supported by a ‘tough on crime’, ‘war on 
bikies’ rhetoric that emphasised the imminent threat posed by these groups. 
This was particularly the case with the earliest laws, the South Australian 
SOCCA and New South Wales Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 
2009 (NSW). In the parliamentary debates concerning these laws, the 
language of terror and terrorism was employed by governments, drawing 
 
 97 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Keeping Secrets: The Protection of Classified and 
Security Sensitive Information, Report No 98 (2004) 379–80 [10.8]. 
 98 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW); Serious Crime Control Act 2009 
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2012 (Vic); Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (WA). 
 99 John Ferguson, ‘Law Institute Questions “Challenge-Proof ” Bikie Laws’, The Australian 
(online), 15 November 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics 
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the Criminal Organisations Control Bill 2011 (WA): Western Australia, Parliamentary De-
bates, Legislative Council, 22 March 2012, 1149 (Michael Mischin): 
Given the financial and legal resources available to organised crime gangs, the govern-
ment is fully aware that every step of this legislation is likely to be litigated, and possibly 
some parts subject to constitutional challenge. Given the onerous and time-consuming 
nature of such challenges, it is the government’s intent with this bill that its key features 
be sufficiently targeted, stringent and varied to make the legislation a worthwhile tool for 
our state’s police and prosecution authorities. 
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analogies between the bikie laws and anti-terror laws. Bikies’ ‘reign of terror’ 
was referred to repeatedly throughout the debate concerning the New South 
Wales Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW), such as by 
Opposition Leader, and later Premier, Barry O’Farrell.100 In the context of 
asking for more detailed scrutiny of the provisions and for the South Australi-
an legislation to be more closely copied,101 Greg Smith, later appointed New 
South Wales Attorney-General, emphasised that the ‘extraordinary’ powers in 
the statute were necessary to fight the ‘war’ on bikies. He said: 
In some ways this bill is akin to the terrorist legislation … Something must be 
done in response to the recent crisis of lawlessness between comparatively 
small groups — almost a civil war. … 
Being humble servants of this Parliament and the community, my leader 
and I will do our best. We do not oppose the legislation because it would be in-
appropriate to stop some action from being taken to end this current war. … 
The Opposition wants to do what can lawfully be done to protect the com-
munity from gangs that are urban terrorists, which is why the Opposition will 
not oppose the conferring of extraordinary powers.102 
The rhetoric of urgency was at times given additional support by outbreaks of 
violence at the hands of bikie gangs. The speedy enactment of the New South 
Wales legislation — the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 
(NSW) was introduced, debated and enacted on 2 April 2009 — was assisted 
by a violent episode at Sydney Airport, in which a clash between rival gangs 
resulted in a man being bashed to death.103 Similar violent clashes in South 
Australia104 and Queensland105 helped to bring the ‘war on bikies’ to the 
forefront of political debate and provided a rationale for governments to 
implement tougher laws aimed at preventing future gang-related crime. Like 
Rann in South Australia, Western Australian Attorney-General Christian 
Porter lauded his State’s Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (WA), which 
 
 100 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 April 2009, 14 449–51. 
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 104 Appleby and Williams, ‘The Anti-Terror Creep’, above n 4, 152, citing South Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 7 May 2008, 2759 (M Parnell). 
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was described as the ‘toughest … in the country’,106 a claim that has since 
been taken up by Queensland.107 
As control order schemes became more common, governments focused 
less on establishing a pressing need for these measures and instead invoked 
the existence of such laws in other jurisdictions both as a justification for like 
laws and as an argument for the state to avoid becoming a safe haven for bikie 
gangs. In this way, once control orders became accepted and no longer 
appeared to be extreme measures, the task for governments became one of 
bringing the laws of their state or territory into line with surround-
ing jurisdictions.108 
Under the New South Wales, Queensland and Northern Territory statutes, 
as under the later Western Australian and Victorian statutes, the bases for 
declaring organisations, the nature of control orders and the provisions 
concerning criminal intelligence were much the same as in the South Austral-
ian SOCCA.109 The key difference between the schemes existed at the declara-
tion stage. In Queensland and Victoria organisations were declared by the 
 
 106 ‘Western Australia to Introduce Toughest Bikie Laws’, news.com.au (online), 13 November 
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Supreme Court.110 In New South Wales, the Northern Territory and Western 
Australia,111 declarations were made by an ‘eligible judge’ or ‘designated 
authority’, being a judge or former judge acting in a personal capacity.112 Only 
under the SOCCA were organisations declared by the Attorney-General. 
Beyond these differences, the schemes were largely identical insofar as they 
provided for secret criminal intelligence evidence throughout declaration and 
control order processes, and for wide-ranging preventive restraints on liberty 
to be ordered on the basis of a person’s links to a declared organisation. The 
Victorian scheme — Victoria being the only jurisdiction to enact control 
order provisions and be subject to a human rights charter113 — contains 
additional protections in the form of a special counsel to assist the respondent 
in respect of criminal intelligence applications.114 
In developments that may have appeared surprising after Thomas v Mow-
bray, in 2010 and 2011 the High Court found that aspects of the South 
Australian and New South Wales control order schemes respectively, offended 
the constitutionally protected independence and integrity of state Courts. The 
High Court’s reasons for striking down these laws did not relate to the vague 
or predictive criteria on which declarations or control orders are issued, the 
impact of the control orders on individual liberty or the schemes’ provisions 
for secret evidence. As in Thomas v Mowbray, the issue concerned the 
separation of judicial power. Although the state court system does not observe 
the strict separation of powers that binds federal courts under the Constitu-
tion, state courts are not immune from its consequences as they are part of a 
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nationally integrated judicial system. A consequence of this is that state courts 
are able to exercise non-judicial power, but only insofar as this is not ‘incom-
patible’ with their fundamental independence and integrity.115 
In South Australia v Totani (‘Totani’) the High Court held that s 14(1) of 
the SOCCA was invalid on the basis that it was incompatible with the inde-
pendence and integrity of the South Australian Magistrates Court.116 The 
Court’s finding of incompatibility was derived solely from the obligation 
placed on the Magistrates Court to issue a control order against a person once 
the Court had determined that the person was a member of the declared 
organisation — the latter classification having been made by the Attorney-
General. According to the High Court, this obligation impermissibly rendered 
the Magistrates Court an instrument of the executive government.117 Whilst 
merely amending the SOCCA to replace the obligatory phrase ‘must’ with a 
discretionary ‘may’ might well have saved the provisions from invalidity, in 
response to the High Court’s decision, the South Australian government 
amended the SOCCA to provide that declarations would be made by an 
‘eligible judge’ acting in his or her personal capacity (as in the New South 
Wales, Western Australian and Northern Territory schemes).118 
Notwithstanding the absence of any similar obligations being placed on 
the eligible judge or the Supreme Court under the New South Wales control 
order scheme, in Wainohu v New South Wales (‘Wainohu’) the High Court 
found that the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) was 
incompatible with judicial independence.119 Like in Totani, the basis of this 
decision rested on a single provision. However, in Wainohu the High Court 
found that the entire statute, not merely the offending provision, was constitu-
tionally invalid. The finding of invalidity stemmed from s 13(2), which 
removed the eligible judge’s duty to give reasons for his or her decision to 
declare an organisation. A majority of the High Court held that the express 
removal of this obligation not only damaged the integrity of the judge, but 
ultimately damaged that of the Supreme Court in the subsequent control 
 
 115 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 82 (Dawson J), 103 (Gaudron J). See also Fardon v 
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 116 (2010) 242 CLR 1. 
 117 See, eg, ibid 21 [3]–[4] (French CJ). 
 118 Serious and Organised Crime (Control) (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2012 (SA) s 6. 
 119 (2011) 243 CLR 181. 
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order proceedings to the point that the scheme as a whole was repugnant to 
the separation of judicial power.120 The New South Wales government 
responded to the decision by amending the offending provision to require that 
reasons be given by the eligible judge for his or her decision to declare 
an organisation.121 
By making findings of constitutional invalidity in Totani and Wainohu, the 
High Court indicated that control order schemes would need to be carefully 
drafted so as to comply with constitutional values. However, by grounding 
invalidity in very narrow bases that seemed to overlook some of the more 
troubling features of control order schemes (such as their imposition of 
preventive restraints on liberty on the basis of secret evidence and predictive, 
even vague, criteria), the Court also seemed to indicate that the control order 
framework was not necessarily at odds with these values. The states harnessed 
this latter suggestion and continued to implement control order schemes that 
were designed to address the points of invalidity without compromising the 
overall nature or impact of control orders. This was reflected, for example, in a 
statement by Western Australian Attorney-General Michael Mischin when he 
introduced that State’s control order scheme to Parliament in 2012. For 
Mischin, the High Court in Wainohu ‘found that there is nothing constitu-
tionally or legally objectionable about the principal underlying objectives of 
these laws’.122 
When Queensland’s Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) was challenged 
before the High Court in 2012, organised crime control order schemes had 
been enacted in almost every Australian state and territory, in addition to the 
federal anti-terror control orders. In fact, pressure was beginning to mount on 
the federal government to take control of the issue of organised crime from 
the states and to itself enact tough national anti-bikie laws.123 It seemed well-
 
 120 Ibid 192 [6] (French CJ and Kiefel J), 229–30 [107]–[109] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and 
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 121 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW) s 13(2). 
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established that the imposition of broad, preventive restraints on liberty on 
the basis of a person’s relationship to a particular organisation, was constitu-
tionally permissible. The fact that the declaration of an organisation could 
occur in secret, and that a court could impose a control order on the basis of 
untested evidence, also appeared to pose no problems of invalidity. 
In Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (‘Pompano’) the 
High Court squarely faced the issue of secrecy in control order proceedings 
and upheld Queensland’s Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld).124 The case 
for invalidity in Pompano rested upon the assertion that withholding criminal 
intelligence evidence from the respondent amounted to a breach of procedur-
al fairness and was, therefore, incompatible with the independence and 
integrity of the Supreme Court of Queensland. This argument failed. 
The validity of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) rested on the 
Supreme Court’s capacity to independently review the secret classification of 
the evidence, and the lack of any obligations as to the use of that evidence. 
Additionally, validity flowed from the Supreme Court’s retention of sufficient 
independence in declaration and control order proceedings to enable it to 
remedy any potential unfairness arising from the use of secret evidence. 
French CJ suggested that the Supreme Court’s existing discretion enabled 
the Court to ‘refuse to act upon criminal intelligence where to do so would 
give rise to a degree of unfairness in the circumstances of the particular 
case’.125 In a joint judgment, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ suggested that 
the Supreme Court could remedy potential unfairness by attributing less 
weight to the secret, and hence unchallenged, evidence.126 Gageler J adopted 
the same general approach, but concluded that the only effective means by 
which the Supreme Court might be able to counter any unfairness arising 
from the secret evidence would be to order a stay of proceedings.127 Therefore, 
for Gageler J, it was the Supreme Court’s capacity to order a stay of proceed-
ings that preserved the validity of the scheme. 
The focus of the High Court’s treatment of the tension between control 
orders and constitutional values rested squarely on the role of the courts, and 
not on the impact of the scheme on individuals. Discussion of principles such 
as open justice and procedural fairness was overshadowed by an emphasis on 
judicial power, traditions and independence. As such, no guiding principles 
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with respect to minimum disclosure were developed beyond ensuring the 
court is capable of independently reviewing the basis of non-disclosure and 
the suggestion by Gageler J that a court may stay proceedings in certain 
circumstances. Likewise, the liberty-infringing nature of a control order 
proved largely irrelevant to the High Court’s assessments of constitutional 
validity throughout the control order cases.128 The protection of the rights of 
the person subject to the control order, the preservation of those qualities of 
the judicial process central to the integrity of the court, and the maintenance 
of the rule of law, therefore hinge entirely upon the judge’s ability to exercise 
his or her inherent jurisdiction to maintain control of proceedings. 
In the control order cases the High Court reinforced the importance of 
constitutional limits on state powers, prompting the South Australian and 
New South Wales governments to significantly enhance the involvement of 
the judiciary in declaration processes and other state and territory govern-
ments to reflect on how their control order provisions impact constitutional 
values. In fact, following Pompano, both New South Wales and South Austral-
ia further amended their control order schemes to mirror Queensland’s 
Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld). Those States now require both declara-
tions and control orders to be issued by the Supreme Court.129 Despite these 
amendments, the cases reveal the limited potential for the High Court to 
restrict legislative innovation as governments try to outdo one another in 
being tough on crime. The grounds for invalidity were narrow and could be 
overcome without altering the nature or impact of control orders. In any 
event, in Pompano, the Court accepted the validity of state control orders, 
lending the framework the constitutional legitimacy that appeared to have 
been undermined by the findings of invalidity in Totani and Wainohu. 
Following Pompano, the process of normalisation seemed to be complete 
in respect of bikie control orders. Declaration and control order schemes 
aimed at serious and organised crime have been enacted in most jurisdictions 
across Australia, and the prospect of a successful constitutional challenge no 
longer poses a significant threat. It did not take long, then, for a government 
to find further inspiration in the federal anti-terror laws and to once again 
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extend the bounds of preventive justice in order to lay claim to having the 
strongest laws and being the toughest on crime. 
IV  CO N T R O L  OR D E R S  SU R PA S S E D:   
N E W  DI R E C T IO N S  I N  T H E  WA R  O N  BI K I E S  
After Pompano, the Queensland government abandoned its only control order 
application under the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld). To date the 
provisions of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) remain unused. A 
change in government in 2012 saw Queensland’s control order scheme 
criticised as a failure and, under the leadership of Liberal National Party 
(‘LNP’) Premier Campbell Newman and Attorney-General Jarrod Bleijie, new 
measures were introduced under the banner of being the ‘toughest’ in the 
country and even the ‘toughest in the world’.130 
The reforms to the criminal justice system introduced by the Newman 
government are far-reaching. They include the introduction of mandatory 
minimum sentences for crimes such as child sex offences and graffiti,131 
reforms to allow the criminal histories of certain persons to be revealed to any 
entity (including the public),132 unexplained wealth laws,133 and a reform 
(since declared unconstitutional) to permit the Attorney-General to order the 
potentially indefinite incarceration of a person at the expiration of his or her 
sentence for sexual offences.134 In addition to these measures, new anti-bikie 
laws were introduced and have formed a particularly controversial aspect of 
the Newman government’s tough on crime policies. 
In one week in October 2013 the Newman government enacted a suite of 
anti-bikie laws. These laws adopted and expanded the attributes of secrecy, 
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crimes of association and preventive restraints on liberty contained in control 
order schemes. In doing so, they harnessed other aspects of the federal anti-
terror laws. As former detective Tim Priest argued: 
The Queensland government hopes its world-first legislation will succeed 
where other jurisdictions failed. … 
Perhaps we need to treat certain groups of outlaw motorcycle gangs as do-
mestic terrorists and treat them in the same manner as we treat political or reli-
gious terrorists in this country. 
Given the outstanding performance of ASIO and the various state counter-
terrorism units in dealing with home-grown violent jihadists, maybe we need 
to bring the same methodology and legislation to fight this new domestic terror 
threat — the outlaw motorcycle gangs — before the problem is irreversible.135 
As Priest’s statement underscores, the rhetoric of urgency, grave threat and 
even terrorism supported the Newman government’s implementation of new 
extreme measures. A closer look at two particularly controversial schemes — 
the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) (‘VLAD Act’) 
and the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Act 
2013 (Qld) (‘CODA’) — reveals that both the processes by which these laws 
were introduced and the nature of the laws themselves bear striking resem-
blance to the federal and state control order schemes discussed above. This 
analysis suggests that these new measures reflect the next stage in the migra-
tion and normalisation of anti-terror laws in the organised crime context, 
namely, the extension of these measures to new extremes. 
During the 15 October 2013 sitting of the Queensland Parliament, be-
tween 2:30 pm and 3:00 am, the VLAD Act and the CODA were introduced, 
debated and enacted.136 The VLAD Act imposes mandatory minimum 
sentences of 15 or 25 years’ imprisonment on ‘vicious lawless associates’ for 
the commission of ‘declared offences’, in addition to the sentences for the 
offences themselves.137 The CODA imposes a range of reforms, including the 
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criminalisation of three or more participants in a declared organisation 
meeting in public.138 We return to the details of these schemes below. 
At the time of enactment, there had been no public consultation in respect 
of these laws because, the government said, ‘of the need to respond urgently to 
the significant public threat these associations pose in Queensland’.139 The 
emphasis on urgency, war and threat that had supported the federal Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth), the SOCCA and New South Wales Crimes 
(Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2012 (NSW), was now being employed 
to justify the rapid enactment of new extreme measures. As Peter Calla-
ghan SC, the President of the Law and Justice Institute of Queensland, said: 
‘These laws are urgently needed, we are told, because this is nothing less than 
a war on bikies’.140 
In the face of concerns raised by Callaghan and others with respect to the 
swift enactment of the laws and their impact on civil liberties, the government 
emphasised the extraordinary and unique threat posed by these groups and 
the ‘war’ in which the State was engaged. In the 15 October debate, the 
LNP member for Broadwater, Verity Barton, for instance, said: 
We have drawn a line in the sand. We have declared a war on bikies. Queens-
landers want us to do something. Action needs to be taken and it is being tak-
en. It has taken this government to stand up and introduce the right suite of 
legislation that we need to put a stop to these criminal motorcycle gangs.141 
Barton’s views echoed an advertising campaign funded by the Department of 
Justice and Attorney-General in the lead-up to the introduction to the laws. 
This campaign, which reportedly cost the Department almost $800 000, 
referred to bikie wars and gang violence, and emphasised that the govern-
ment’s ‘tough new laws’ were ‘drawing a line’ on criminal bikie gangs.142 The 
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bikie laws that were enacted under this familiar banner of urgency, war and 
grave threat extend legal frameworks beyond the control order paradigm by 
adapting aspects of these civil orders to the criminal sphere. 
The VLAD Act imposes a mandatory minimum sentencing regime on 
‘vicious lawless associates’. As French CJ and Hayne J later acknowledged, a 
person need not qualify as either vicious or lawless in order to be a vicious 
lawless associate under the VLAD Act.143 In fact, for French CJ, ‘[t]he term 
“vicious lawless association”, which appears in the title to the VLAD Act, … is 
a piece of rhetoric which is at best meaningless and at worst misleads as to the 
scope and substance of the law’.144 
A person qualifies as a vicious lawless associate if three conditions are met. 
First, he or she must participate in the activities of a group — that is, any legal 
or illegal group of three or more people.145 Secondly, the person must commit 
a ‘declared offence’ whilst participating in, or for the purposes of, that 
group.146 The schedule to the VLAD Act contains a list of 69 declared offences, 
including robbery, sexual and violent offences, possession of dangerous drugs 
or weapons, unlawful assembly, dangerous operation of a vehicle, obscene 
publications and exhibitions, bomb hoaxes, and money laundering.147 Thirdly, 
the purposes of the group must include the commission of the declared 
offence. This final condition will be presumed and the onus rests with the 
person to prove that the group does not have the relevant purpose.148 If these 
three conditions are met then the person will not only be sentenced according 
to the usual sentencing principles, but will face an additional mandatory 
minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment without parole.149 Persons who 
are office bearers (a criterion that includes those who formally hold an office 
as well as those who those who assert, declare or advertise themselves as 
authority figures within the group) face an additional mandatory sentence of 
10 years’ — a total of 25 years’ — imprisonment without parole.150 Parole may 
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be granted only at the (unreviewable) discretion of the Police Commissioner 
if the person cooperates with police and the Commissioner is satisfied that his 
or her cooperation is of significant use in a proceeding about a de-
clared offence.151 
The VLAD Act is politically aimed at bikie gangs,152 but like the state con-
trol order schemes discussed in Part III, it clearly has the potential for a much 
broader reach.153 Vicious lawless associates could include child pornography 
rings, thieves who work in groups, people who use or sell drugs in groups, 
drag racers, or a protest group that orchestrates an unlawful assembly or riot. 
A person who commits any one of the extensive list of declared offences in a 
group of three or more people will face the task of positively proving that the 
group did not have the purpose of committing the declared offence, or face 15 
(or 25) years’ imprisonment in addition to the usual sentence for the crime. In 
this context, the Police Commissioner’s capacity to shorten that additional 
sentence in return for cooperation may appear irresistible.154 
Although distinct from existing control order and terrorist organisation 
offences, the mandatory sentencing scheme under the VLAD Act rests on the 
same rationale that a person’s links to a criminal group justify the imposition 
of significant restraints on his or her liberty. It is hard to say whether the 
mandatory term of imprisonment is an additional punishment on the basis of 
group membership — as Bleijie suggested when introducing the VLAD Act to 
Parliament and the High Court later indicated — or a preventive restraint on 
liberty.155 The VLAD Act avoids the declaration process and directly penalises 
the group-based nature of a criminal offence, leaving the final decision as to a 
group’s criminal nature with the court — as in terrorism prosecutions that 
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allow for the ad hoc declaration of organisations by the judge. In this and 
other ways (such as through the mandatory nature of the sentences and the 
reversal of the onus of proof) the VLAD Act reflects the harnessing of 
community fear and the rhetoric of war to expand and challenge existing 
criminal justice frameworks. 
The CODA compliments the VLAD Act by, among other things, creating a 
new criminal offence of ‘[p]articipants in a criminal organisation being 
knowingly present in public places’.156 This offence is committed if three or 
more people are together in a public place and each of them is identifiable as a 
participant in a declared organisation. A person ‘participates’ in a declared 
organisation by, inter alia, in any way asserting or seeking membership of the 
organisation.157 For example, a participant may be identified by saying he or 
she would like to be part of the organisation, or by carrying a card or wearing 
the insignia of the organisation. As under the original SOCCA control order 
scheme and the federal scheme for listing terrorist organisations, the CODA 
provides that organisations may be declared by the Attorney-General.158 
To date Bleijie has declared 26 such organisations.159 These declarations are 
not subject to judicial review and are made in secret. Bleijie has stated that the 
reasons for his decisions to declare the organisations may never be made 
public.160 The fact that the courts are kept out of the declaration process under 
the CODA distinguishes the declaration scheme from existing state and 
territory control order statutes. This approach also avoids many of the 
separation of powers issues that supported the High Court challenges in 
Wainohu and Pompano. 
The punishment for committing the offence of ‘participants in a criminal 
organisation being knowingly present in public places’ is a mandatory 
minimum sentence of six months’ imprisonment without parole.161 A person 
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may defend the charge by proving that the declared organisation does not 
have a purpose of engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, criminal activity.162 
The CODA has been applied in a number of instances. In one case Sally 
Kuether — a librarian, mother of three, and community service award holder 
with no criminal history — met her fiancé and his friend at a local hotel for a 
drink. Kuether was wearing the insignia of the Life and Death motorcycle 
gang, to which her fiancé and his friend allegedly belonged. The police 
arrested all three under the CODA, opposed bail and raided Kuether’s 
home.163 She now faces a mandatory minimum sentence of six months’, and 
up to three years’, imprisonment. Following her release on bail, Kuether said 
to the media: ‘I can’t see what I’ve done wrong, all I did was have a beer with 
my partner and my mate’.164 
In 2014, Stefan Kuczborski, a member of the Hells Angels Motorcycle 
Club, challenged the constitutional validity of the VLAD Act and the CODA, 
as well as other aspects of the Newman government’s anti-bikie laws, such as 
amendments to the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) and Bail Act 1980 (Qld).165 Kucz-
borski had not been charged with offences created by or invoking the im-
pugned provisions. Nonetheless he argued that as a member of the Hells 
Angels (a declared organisation), he had an interest in the laws that surpassed 
that of the general public. 
In Kuczborski v Queensland (‘Kuczborski’), the High Court held that 
Mr Kuczborski lacked sufficient standing to challenge all but the CODA and 
amendments to the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) relating to the wearing of insignias 
or carrying certain items onto licensed premises.166 As to these provisions, a 
majority of the Court (Hayne J dissenting) upheld their validity. For the 
majority justices, the creation of offences under the CODA, including the 
offence of ‘participants in [a] criminal organisation being knowingly present 
in public places’,167 did not enlist the judiciary to give effect to parliamentary 
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or executive intention,168 or ‘cloak the work of the legislature or executive in 
the neutral colours of judicial action’,169 or usurp judicial power.170 Whilst the 
executive unilaterally declares which organisations are criminal organisations, 
this declaration alone is insufficient to establish criminal guilt. That all-
important determination is made by a court according to ordinary judicial 
processes, considering each element of the offence as established by evidence 
and legal argument in an open hearing.171 Thus, for the majority justices, the 
independence and institutional integrity of Queensland courts was preserved. 
By this reasoning the High Court in Kuczborski gave constitutional legiti-
macy to schemes in which organisations are declared by the executive (as is 
the case under the federal anti-terrorism laws and the original SOCCA) by a 
secretive, unreviewable process. That declaration may give rise to criminal 
proceedings against affiliates of the organisation based on seemingly innocu-
ous behaviour, such as meeting in public and wearing certain clothes or 
emblems, provided that the trial adheres to usual judicial processes and the 
independent discretion of the judge is maintained. 
The VLAD Act and the CODA bear important similarities to control orders 
and federal anti-terrorism laws. Each hinges criminal consequences on a 
person’s links to an organisation, rather than focusing on the conduct of the 
individual. This approach of attaching serious legal consequences to a person’s 
mere involvement with a criminal organisation is characteristic of control 
orders. However, every control order scheme vested the final decisions as to 
whether to issue the order and the appropriate terms of the order with a court. 
Both the VLAD Act and the CODA remove the court’s discretion in the latter 
respect by coupling notions of criminal organisations with mandatory 
sentencing. 
The VLAD Act and the CODA adapt fundamental aspects of the control 
order paradigm to the criminal justice sphere, magnifying the severity of the 
provisions and their impact on traditional frameworks and fundamental 
values. The CODA harnesses the framework for declared organisations and 
the idea of placing significant restraints on a person’s liberty on the basis of his 
or her connection with such an organisation. The VLAD Act expands this idea 
to declared offences, as well as drawing on the provisions of the Criminal Code 
(Cth) that allow courts to declare terrorist organisations in the context of 
 
 168 Kuczborski (2014) 314 ALR 528, 577–8 [219]–[227] (Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ). 
 169 Ibid 579 [229]; see generally at 579 [228]–[231]. 
 170 Ibid 579–81 [232]–[238]. 
 171 Ibid 579–81 [230]–[238]. 
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terrorism prosecutions. Like those ad hoc declarations, the VLAD Act 
envisages that criminal organisations can be identified and their members 
punished even when the Attorney-General did not declare the organisa-
tion earlier. 
Whilst an attraction of control orders was their civil nature, and thus the 
avoidance of criminal burdens of proof,172 the Newman government had 
moved the paradigm to the criminal sphere and avoided having to meet the 
criminal standard by reversing the onus of proof in crucial ways. Thus, control 
orders first emerged as an alternative to the criminal justice process, given 
concerns about that process, but are now being adapted and reintegrated 
within that criminal justice system in ways that throw up a range of 
new concerns. 
The VLAD Act and the offence of participants meeting in public were just 
two facets of the Newman government’s much broader scheme of tough anti-
bikie laws.173 In other reforms, abandoned in the lead-up to the state election 
in January 2015,174 individuals imprisoned under the bikie laws would have 
been forced to wear fluorescent pink overalls in prison because, Newman said, 
‘[w]e know that telling them to wear pink is going to be embarrassing for 
them’.175 Moreover, imprisoned members of criminal organisations would 
also have been subject to ‘criminal organisation segregation orders’ requiring 
their separation from other prisoners — that is, solitary confinement.176 
The Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission has been given addi-
tional powers to conduct closed, secret hearings into the range of issues 
referred to it (including organised crime, terrorist activity and other serious 
crime). At these hearings, individuals face mandatory minimum terms of 
imprisonment for refusing to answer a question or produce a thing without a 
 
 172 See the INSLM’s comments cited above about control orders being considered primarily in 
circumstances where there was insufficient proof upon which to mount a conviction: 
see above n 55 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Trotter and Hobbs, above n 134, 3. 
 174 ‘Newman Tipped to Lose Seat Despite LNP Win’, Brisbane Times (online), 22 July 2014 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/newman-tipped-to-lose-seat-despite-lnp-wi 
n-20140722-zvrt9.html>; Amy Remeikis, ‘Queensland State Election: Campbell Newman 
Promotes VLAD Laws’, Brisbane Times (online), 7 January 2015 <http://www.brisbanetimes. 
com.au/queensland/queensland-state-election-2015/queensland-state-election-campbell-new 
man-promotes-vlad-laws-20150107-12jafx.html>. 
 175 ‘Pink for Punks: Queensland Plan to Embarrass Bikies in Jail’, The Guardian (online), 21 
October 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/21/pink-for-punks-queenslan 
d-bikies>. 
 176 Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
2013 (Qld) s 14. 
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reasonable excuse.177 Fear of retribution has been specifically excluded as a 
reasonable excuse in this context.178 In addition, the Newman government’s 
reforms prevent participants in criminal organisations from being employed 
in a range of positions, such as electricians, builders and tattoo artists,179 and 
provide for the public disclosure of their criminal histories.180 Indeed this 
disclosure is authorised in respect of anyone who has ‘at any time been’ a 
participant in a declared organisation.181 These reforms build upon the idea of 
guilt by association established by the introduction and spread of control 
order schemes. 
Andrew Trotter and Harry Hobbs have argued that Bleijie and Newman 
have orchestrated a ‘great leap backward’ for the criminal justice system in 
Queensland.182 Their critique demonstrates the gravity of the reforms as 
viewed in a broad historical context. However, by looking at more recent 
history — since 9/11 — we can see that the roots of these reforms lie in federal 
anti-terror laws. Queensland has built upon and now significantly extended 
federal and state laws that began with the terrorist organisation offences 
enacted in 2002 and the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). Certainly the 
process by which the laws were enacted bears a strong resemblance to the 
Howard government’s response of ‘hyper-legislation’ following 9/11, and the 
laws themselves build directly upon the declaration processes that migrated 
with control orders and the organisation offences that originally accompanied 
the federal terrorist organisation provisions. 
V  NO R M A L I S AT IO N  A N D  T H E   
R O L E  O F  CO N S T I T U T I O NA L  V A LU E S 
In the context of the global war on terror, the federal Parliament enacted a 
suite of exceptional measures aimed at preventing terrorism. These measures, 
including control orders and the declaration of terrorist organisations, were 
 
 177 Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) s 198(4), as inserted by CODA s 28. These terms are at 
the court’s discretion for the first charge, two years and six months for the second, and five 
years for the third: Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) s 199(8B), as inserted by CODA 
s 30. 
 178 Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) s 74(5A). 
 179 Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
2013 (Qld) pts 8, 14, 19. 
 180 Ibid pt 13. 
 181 Ibid s 123, inserting Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 10.2AAA (definition of 
‘current or former participant’). 
 182 Trotter and Hobbs, above n 134. 
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not designed or intended for implementation outside the terrorism context. 
The debate around the laws linked the schemes’ exceptional nature with the 
extraordinary threat posed by terrorism. What has followed, however, is the 
steady migration of these measures to new contexts at the state and territo-
ry levels. 
The processes of migration and normalisation described have been multi-
dimensional. First, the control order paradigm itself migrated across contexts 
and jurisdictions. Anti-terror control orders became serious and organised 
crime control orders — in each case providing an alternative to the criminal 
justice system and permitting a wide range of potential obligations and 
restrictions to be placed on a person for the purpose of preventing criminal 
activity. This enabled control orders to evolve from an exceptional and 
extreme measure to an established paradigm of preventive justice. As a result 
it is well-accepted today, at least by the majority of Australia’s Parliaments, 
that preventive restraints on an individual’s liberty may be justifiably imposed 
by reference to that person’s links to a widespread, amorphous threat, particu-
larly one presented by fearsome groups such as terrorist cells or outlaw 
motorcycle gangs. 
Secondly, more subtle aspects of the control order framework also migrat-
ed and normalised. By focusing on a person’s association with a criminal 
organisation, control order schemes require companion processes by which 
those organisations may be identified. The first state control order scheme, the 
SOCCA, simply adapted the federal approach by which the Attorney-General 
declares terrorist organisations. Later schemes and amendments moved this 
process into the judicial sphere in order to provide a better safeguard and to 
align more closely with constitutional values, including the separation of 
judicial power that underpinned the High Court’s decisions in Totani and 
Wainohu. The latest Queensland laws have shifted the responsibility for 
declaring organisations back to the Attorney-General, returning to the design 
of the original anti-terror laws. The scheme of ad hoc declarations by courts 
during terror trials has also been adapted. The scheme under the VLAD Act of 
imposing additional mandatory minimum sentences on persons who commit 
declared offences in groups reflects aspects of the federal anti-terror laws 
which allow courts to identify criminal organisations in the context of certain 
prosecutions. This suggests that the idea of declared organisations providing a 
precursor to proceedings against participants in those organisations has both 
migrated and normalised. However, the fact that different jurisdictions have 
adopted different approaches to reconciling the declaration process with the 
separation of powers indicates that no single model has been settled upon and 
that the design of declaration processes may continue to evolve. 
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The underlying rationale behind declaration proceedings has also under-
gone a process of normalisation. The declaration of organisations is linked 
strongly with the imposition of restraints on the liberties of persons linked to 
that organisation. In this way, the process embodies ideas of guilt by associa-
tion — that certain people ought to be controlled and restricted simply 
because they associate with a certain group. In the control order schemes a 
person’s links to a declared organisation prompt a potentially vast set of 
obligations and restrictions being imposed by the judiciary. The new Queens-
land laws are built upon the same rationale. However, these reforms harness 
this underlying notion to impose criminal sanctions that are largely deter-
mined by the executive. Thus, the normalisation of the rationale behind 
control orders has supported the extension of the notions of guilt by associa-
tion and preventive justice from the civil to the criminal sphere. 
In addition to the notions of declared organisations and control orders 
migrating across contexts, the secrecy that imbues each stage of the anti-terror 
framework has also spread. In order to combat future threats posed by 
complex criminal networks, the government has asserted time and time again 
that it must act in secret. Thus, the intelligence–evidence overlap and its 
consequence of greater secrecy in judicial proceedings, as observed by Roach 
and others in respect of anti-terror laws,183 has now become a characteristic of 
organised crime laws across Australia. Instead of ‘national security infor-
mation’ providing the basis of secrecy in declaration and control order 
proceedings, provisions in state and territory laws now routinely provide for 
‘criminal intelligence’ to be withheld from the person and his or her repre-
sentatives. A pervasive emphasis on secrecy is familiar in the national security 
context, but was relatively unheard of in the ordinary criminal justice system 
which is built upon fundamental principles such as open justice and adver-
sarialism. 
Finally, not only the laws themselves, but the process by which extreme 
measures are enacted, has migrated across contexts. The language employed 
to support the enactment of extreme anti-terror measures by the Howard 
government seems to have provided a template for the successful enactment 
of extreme organised crime measures in the states and territories. Emphasis-
ing the serious threat posed by feared groups and the need for urgent action, 
legislators push for an attenuated parliamentary process that may involve 
limited public consultation and scrutiny. The consistency with which phrases 
like ‘war’ and ‘terror’ have been used in support of these measures is striking. 
 
 183 See above n 96 and accompanying text. 
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This rhetoric has clear roots in the anti-terror context, and has now been 
paired with the ‘tough on crime’, ‘toughest in the country’ and even ‘toughest 
in the world’ claims of state governments so as to facilitate the rapid enact-
ment of organised crime measures. The longer term impact of the war on 
terror is clearly visible in the language that continues to surround the intro-
duction and justification of extreme measures. Bikies, it would seem, are the 
new terrorists. 
In these ways we have seen the migration and normalisation not only of 
exceptional laws, but also of their more subtle, inherent, aspects and even of 
the process by which they are introduced and enacted. In 2005, there was no 
reason to suspect that this process of migration of anti-terror laws, let alone 
their normalisation or extension, was intended or foreseen by political actors. 
How then did this unintended consequence occur? 
There is little to suggest that the migration of control orders from the  
anti-terror to the organised crime context was a consequence of the measure 
being particularly effective at preventing crime. Only two anti-terror control 
orders have ever been issued, and only the control order over Hicks reached 
the confirmation stage. As Lynch argued, there were strong reasons to suspect 
that neither Hicks nor Thomas necessarily posed any danger to the Australian 
community or was likely to be contacted by a terrorist group.184 In his 2012 
report on the control order provisions and their use, the INSLM recommend-
ed that the provisions be repealed on the bases of their ineffectiveness and the 
availability of more appropriate intelligence gathering and criminal justice 
measures.185 The INSLM observed that agencies preferred to pursue intelli-
gence activities rather than control orders as ‘surveillance surely promises 
better value for money’186 and, he said, there is currently ‘no ground to believe 
that [control orders] have any demonstrated efficacy as a preventive mecha-
nism’.187 
One demonstrated advantage of anti-terror control orders is that they 
enable prolonged preventive restraints on liberty to be placed on individuals 
in circumstances where there is insufficient evidence on which to prosecute 
the person for an offence. The INSLM’s investigation revealed that this 
advantage is well-known to the AFP and has motivated 40 per cent of 
 
 184 See Lynch, ‘Thomas v Mowbray’, above n 58, 1187. Lynch refers to Thomas, but the point 
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 185 INSLM, above n 24, 43–4. 
 186 Ibid 28. 
 187 Ibid 38. 
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instances in which that organisation has considered seeking a control order.188 
This advantage may have appeared attractive to state and territory govern-
ments wishing to look tough on crime but remaining frustrated by the high 
thresholds and procedural safeguards of the criminal justice system. 
A reason behind the migration of the control order paradigm seems also to 
lie in the interaction between the states’ tough on crime policy platforms and 
High Court decisions that lent the schemes the appearance of constitutional 
legitimacy. The High Court’s decision to uphold anti-terror control orders in 
Thomas v Mowbray kickstarted the migration of control order schemes and 
led to their normalisation and expansion. In Thomas v Mowbray, the High 
Court created a ‘loaded weapon’ of precedent that, as Jackson J famously 
warned in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu v United States, ‘lies about … 
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of 
an urgent need’.189 It did not take long for state and territory governments, 
driven by politically successful tough on crime policy platforms, to point to an 
urgent need to stop the ‘urban terror’ perpetrated by bikie gangs, and to take 
this loaded weapon in hand to fight a ‘war on bikies’. 
Following Thomas v Mowbray, control orders presented an attractive, and 
apparently constitutionally permissible, means of cracking down on feared 
groups within the community before crimes had necessarily been committed. 
In enacting these schemes, state and territory governments harnessed the 
rhetoric of urgency, war, terror and serious threat that had accompanied the 
enactment of the federal anti-terror laws and paired it with their longer-
running tough on crime claims. Together these strategies served to justify the 
swift implementation of exceptional measures, and fed on community fear 
and concerns in order to attract popular support. 
The later cases of Totani and Wainohu slowed this process of migration 
and normalisation by appearing to undermine the constitutional legitimacy of 
control orders. However, the cases only indicated that particular provisions 
were constitutionally repugnant. These provisions could be easily amended 
without impacting the overall aims or nature of control orders or declaration 
proceedings. The schemes as a whole, from their onerous potential to inhibit 
liberty to their severe impositions on fair process, seemed to be outside the 
concern of constitutional limits on government powers. Thus, these decisions 
only prompted state governments to experiment with their control order 
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schemes, seeking to comply with constitutional principles whilst maintaining 
strong law and order policies. 
This experience reveals the capacity for constitutional values to have a 
legitimising effect that facilitates the migration, normalisation and extension 
of exceptional measures across contexts. However, these values have also 
played an important role in checking this same process. Constitutional 
challenges followed each attempt by a government to use its control order 
provisions for the first time. Whilst the federal and Queensland control order 
schemes survived constitutional challenge, the South Australian and New 
South Wales schemes did not, prompting those governments to refine their 
approaches so as to better comply with the constitutionally mandated 
separation of judicial power. In fact, both the South Australian and New 
South Wales governments took significant steps to judicialise the declaration 
processes in each State, above and beyond what the High Court had indicated 
was required to remedy the causes of invalidity. The Western Australian 
government openly refrained from finalising its control order scheme until it 
could be sure that its provisions would comply with the High Court’s guid-
ance on valid control orders.190 Despite the decisions in Totani and Wainohu 
resting on narrow grounds, the cases propelled governments to involve courts 
in declaration proceedings and to justify the schemes by reference to constitu-
tional values.191 
With the validation of Queensland’s Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) 
in Pompano, a template for valid provisions arose and Western Australia and 
Victoria let their ‘challenge-proof ’ schemes commence with little need for the 
same emphasis on urgency or imminent threat. In fact, the adoption of 
control order schemes from 2012 no longer appeared particularly ‘tough’, but 
instead simply brought their laws into line with those of surrounding  
jurisdictions. 
One might have expected that the migration and normalisation of control 
orders to the ordinary criminal law would have been cemented when Pompa-
no was handed down in 2012; the control order paradigm had spread across 
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Australia and gained constitutional legitimacy. However, two factors compli-
cated this situation and led to the next stage: that is, the expansion of the 
control order paradigm into new territory. First, the governments of most 
states and territories have continued to vie for the mantle of ‘toughest on 
crime’.192 This contest requires new reforms and innovations in order for each 
government to demonstrate that it is tougher, stronger and less tolerant of 
criminal behaviour as compared to both previous governments and the 
governments of surrounding jurisdictions. In addition, the effectiveness of 
control orders at preventing crime still has not been demonstrated — the 
provisions have failed to produce tangible, politically popular results in any 
jurisdiction. Without being able to point to past success, governments are 
driven to implement new reforms to exhibit their hard-line criminal jus-
tice policies. 
This was the context in which the Newman government labelled control 
orders as a failure and introduced the ‘toughest [laws] in the world’ to fight its 
war on bikies.193 The language of urgency, war and severe threat were again 
invoked, not only in parliamentary debate but in a widespread and costly 
advertising campaign. Even with the close of the global war on terror the 
Queensland government continued to invoke the language of terror and 
terrorism to support its suite of extreme measures. 
Like the earlier control order cases, Kuczborski’s challenge to the VLAD 
Act, the CODA and other aspects of the Newman government’s anti-bikie laws 
drew upon the separation of judicial power. As the High Court was unani-
mous in its finding that Kuczborski lacked sufficient standing to challenge the 
VLAD Act and Bail Act 1980 (Qld), the validity of these measures remains 
unresolved. However, the decision gives legitimacy to the CODA and to the 
anti-bikie provisions of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld). Past experience would 
suggest that a process of migration, normalisation and even extension of these 
extreme measures may soon follow. Indeed, there are hints that this process 
has already begun. Within weeks of the enactment of Queensland’s new bikie 
laws, the Western Australian government introduced legislation criminalising 
participation in, and recruitment to, criminal organisations.194 Each of these 
crimes is punishable by 5 years’ imprisonment, which looks meagre in 
comparison to Queensland’s harsh mandatory minimum terms of 15 or 25 
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years’ imprisonment. Following the decision in Kuczborski, not only the 
Western Australian Attorney-General, but his counterparts in South Australia 
and the Northern Territory indicated that they would be considering the 
decision very carefully, with an eye to proposing tougher bikie laws in their 
own jurisdiction.195 
Even without litigation, constitutional values have a crucial role to play in 
controlling the processes of migration and normalisation. The language of 
fairness, democracy and the rule of law featured heavily in the political debate 
and outcry over the anti-bikie laws, as reflected in Peter Callaghan’s statement 
on the VLAD Act.196 In a rare instance of opposition, some judges in Queens-
land have expressed their concerns with the new anti-bikie laws.197 This 
prompted Chief Magistrate Tim Carmody, since appointed Chief Justice of 
Queensland, to publicly warn newly admitted magistrates that ‘[i]t is clearly 
wrong … for judges to deliberately frustrate or defeat the policy goals of what 
they might personally regard as unfair … laws’.198 
Carmody’s comments underscore the tension that exists for judges, and 
others, in weighing their fidelity to apparently competing constitutional 
values. On the one hand, the bikie laws challenge fairness, openness, propor-
tionality, justice, judicial integrity, and the rule of law. On the other hand, they 
represent Parliament responding to a political issue by legislative means that, 
on present authorities, appear to be in keeping with the constitutional rules 
and principles enunciated by the High Court. 
Now that the CODA has survived a constitutional challenge, it is very like-
ly that Western Australia and other states and territories may well bring their 
laws into line with those of the Newman government. It appears that either a 
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strong assertion of constitutional values or a shift away from tough on crime 
policy platforms will be required in order to check the ongoing normalisation 
and expansion of extreme measures. In the absence of direct constitutional 
protection for rights or liberties — Australia being the only democratic nation 
without any form of national bill or charter of rights — and little indication of 
a waning in the tough on crime policies in the states, the trends observed in 
this paper may continue to evolve for some time. 
VI  C O N C LU SI O N  
In the years since 9/11, Australia has experienced significant shifts in its 
traditional legal frameworks. The federal government’s ‘hyper-legislative’ 
response to the global war on terror has proven to be only the beginning of 
that shift. Through the interplay between hard-line law and order policy 
platforms in the states and territories and High Court cases that seemed to 
lend constitutional legitimacy to extreme measures, Australia has witnessed a 
multidimensional migration and normalisation of anti-terror laws to new 
contexts. Once a novel and exceptional measure, control orders have now 
been implemented in every state and territory but for the Australian Capital 
Territory and Tasmania, rendering those two jurisdictions outliers in terms of 
their criminal justice frameworks. This migration and normalisation of 
control orders has occurred in parallel to the spread of frameworks for 
declaring criminal organisations, secret evidence in judicial proceedings, and 
expanded notions of preventive justice and crimes of association. Even the 
process by which control orders were enacted, particularly the rhetoric that 
supported the rapid passage of the provisions, has been replicated across 
jurisdictions. The ‘war on terror’ has become a ‘war on bikies’, with bikies 
regularly labelled ‘urban terrorists’ and accused of perpetrating a reign of 
terror on the community. 
Developments in Queensland demonstrate the next stage in the migration 
and normalisation process: namely, the extension of these measures to new 
extremes. The Newman government’s anti-bikie laws are built upon the same 
underlying rationale as the anti-terror laws and subsequent control order 
schemes, and harness the same political rhetoric to garner community and 
political support. The unsuccessful constitutional challenge to some of those 
laws in Kuczborski may signal the continuation of a cycle by which extreme 
measures migrate, normalise and may even give rise to new extremes. 
All this demonstrates how the rhetoric used initially to justify anti-terror 
laws such as control orders, including the notion of a temporary war in which 
extreme measures were justified, was misleading. With the end of the interna-
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tional war on terror, the legal weapons deployed in aid of that conflict remain 
with us. The frameworks that extended into new territory to meet the threat of 
terror have become an established part of the legal landscape. Now these 
frameworks are being adapted to meet new threats — threats within the 
ordinary criminal justice sphere. With the benefit of hindsight we can see that 
during times of community fear, staunch adherence to fundamental values 
throughout the legislative process is imperative in protecting fundamental 
rights from long-term erosion. 
This story of legitimisation, migration and normalisation highlights the 
difficult position of Australian courts in seeking to prevent constitutional 
values from legislative incursion. The High Court’s approach, constrained as it 
is to structural judicial review based on legislative capacity and the separation 
of powers, has succeeded in preserving the judiciary’s decisional independ-
ence — a government cannot force a judge’s hand. However, the control order 
cases failed to address some of the clearest problems arising from the provi-
sions and ultimately played a role in facilitating the migration and normalisa-
tion of once-extreme measures. 
Without explicit protections for liberty or fairness in the Constitution, 
judges must rely on implications arising from the separation of judicial power 
(itself an implied doctrine) to preserve fundamental liberties and values. The 
control order cases demonstrate that the separation of powers is a far from 
perfect tool in the protection of basic rights. The High Court’s focus on the 
independence with which these powers were exercised was inevitable, given 
the limited scope of Australia’s judicially enforceable constitutional values, but 
ultimately proved distracting and tangential in light of the severe impositions 
on liberty and fairness effected by the schemes.199 For example, in Pompano 
the Chief Justice recognised that secret criminal intelligence evidence was 
‘antithetical’ to the ‘method of administering justice’ that lies at the heart of 
the common law tradition.200 However, the Court was bound by existing 
precedent and by the Constitution’s focus on judicial independence, and so 
these unfair201 provisions were upheld and thereby gained an appearance of 
constitutional legitimacy. 
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Clearly, the Court’s decision in Kuczborski has the capacity to facilitate the 
further migration and extension of extreme measures. But this decision has a 
limited scope and invites further litigation to test the VLAD Act and other 
aspects of the Newman government’s suite of anti-bikie laws. Constitutional 
values playing out in the legal and political spheres may yet succeed in 
checking and even winding back the process of migration, normalisation and 
extension that has seen anti-terror laws adapted to the organised crime 
context. However, the High Court has little to work with in the absence of 
explicit constitutional protections for human rights or fair process. 
Our analysis has focused on the Australian experience. It is coloured by 
the system of Australian federalism in which the states bear primary respon-
sibility for law and order, and by the uncommon absence of a national bill or 
charter of rights. However, the processes of migration and normalisation 
discussed have global relevance.202 The war on terror had a sweeping impact 
on legal frameworks. Indeed, Australia’s original anti-terror control orders 
were adapted from the United Kingdom.203 The United Kingdom’s definition 
of terrorism has similarly migrated to Canada, Singapore, Israel and other 
jurisdictions, including Australia.204 Within the United Kingdom the control 
order framework also underwent a process of migration with, for example, the 
enactment of serious crime control order schemes.205 The tensions between 
constitutional values and preventive anti-terror measures have been experi-
enced widely and have given rise to a substantial body of critique and 
jurisprudence. Within this broader context, the Australian experience 
provides a cautionary tale as to the potential for extreme measures to not only 
migrate and normalise, but to lead to new extremes within a relatively short 
 
 202 See, eg, Laura K Donohue, ‘Transplantation’ in Victor V Ramraj et al (eds), Global Anti-
Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 67. 
 203 See generally Susan Donkin, Preventing Terrorism and Controlling Risk: A Comparative 
Analysis of Control Orders in the UK and Australia (Springer, 2014); Lynch, ‘Control Orders 
in Australia’, above n 3; Lynch, Tulich and Welsh, above n 3; Burton and Williams, above n 3. 
 204 Roach, The 9/11 Effect, above n 2, 443. See also Clive Walker, ‘The Reshaping of Control 
Orders in the United Kingdom: Time for a Fairer Go, Australia!’ (2013) 37 Melbourne Univer-
sity Law Review 143. 
 205 Roach, The 9/11 Effect, above n 2, 444. However, in the United Kingdom control orders were 
far more frequently used than in Australia, and have since been repealed and replaced with a 
similar scheme of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (‘TPIMs’): see generally 
Clive Walker and Alexander Horne, ‘The Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures 
Act 2011: One Thing but Not Much the Other?’ [2012] Criminal Law Review 421; Helen 
Fenwick, ‘Preventive Anti-Terrorist Strategies in the UK and ECHR: Control Orders, TPIMs 
and the Role of Technology’ (2011) 25 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 
129. 
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timeframe. In this way, the war on terror can have an impact that transcends 
jurisdictional and contextual boundaries. 
